

signed into law, at least in the next session, and I appreciate very much his leadership in this area.

Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

BOSNIA

I. MISTAKES OF THE PAST

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, many mistakes have been made in Yugoslavia, the most tragic by the parties themselves. All of the mistakes made by the international community added together do not even register on the scale compared to what the parties have done to each other.

Nevertheless, we should learn from our mistakes. Such mistakes include premature international recognition of the separate states before any agreement on minority rights or before any basic test for state viability. Another mistake was the United States and European failure—primarily, at the first instance, European failure—to deal decisively with the first Serb aggression. Commitment of a lightly armed U.N. peacekeeping force in the middle of a civil war was another mistake. Dual-key arrangements required for military action with the United Nations in control was certainly a fundamental violation of any kind of a real effective command structure. And the United Nations constantly posed threats and deadlines with no followthrough, thereby steadily losing credibility. I could go on and on.

This is not, however, meant to denigrate in any way the efforts, often heroic, of the U.N. forces and the numerous international organizations that provided humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian people. Tens of thousands of lives were saved.

There are many lessons for Europe, the United Nations, for NATO, and for our own country in this tragedy that has caused so much hardship and cost so many lost lives.

Mr. President, the job now is to learn from the past and also face the reality of the future. United States and NATO forces face many obstacles and risks in Bosnia, but there is also a bright side based on events that have already occurred and also an opportunity for the future.

II. POSITIVE SIDE

Let me start today with the positive side. On the positive side, the NATO allies finally seem to mean business. Just a few examples: French President Chirac led an effort to provide greater combat capability to the U.N. protection force, and he exercised leadership in firming up the allies' commitment. NATO, urged by the Clinton administration, sent a clear and unmistakable signal of its determination with its bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb command, control and communication facilities when they continued to flaunt their own obligations.

President Clinton seized the opportunity presented by the bombing campaign and the Federation ground campaign to launch an intensive diplomatic effort under the effective leadership of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke that resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement between the parties. The Croatian and the Federation ground campaign, together with the peace agreement, greatly improved the clarity of lines separating the parties making a peace enforcement mission more feasible and less dangerous.

Finally, strong leadership by President Clinton and the United States in this area is producing tangible and positive results in NATO. Just a few of those results in NATO, some of which are truly remarkable.

First of all, Germany is providing troops for this first time "out of area" NATO operation. Second, French troops will be operating under NATO command and control. France has announced its return to regular participation in the NATO military committee. This is a reversal, Mr. President, of 30 years of French policy. Russia has agreed to place its forces under the operational control of an American general. Russia will consult with NATO on a 16-nation to one-nation basis, but will not have a veto over NATO decisions.

These events have the potential to lead to future developments with Russia that could have a decidedly positive impact on European security in the years ahead. There are also, of course, potential downsides to this arrangement. There will be no substitute for constant high-level vigilance to this Russian military participation, both in Washington and in Moscow, as well as in the field. This one bears very careful and close nurturing and attention.

All NATO nations except Iceland, as well as many other nations, have committed forces to Bosnia. The United States forces will be primarily in the Tuzla area where the roads and terrain are difficult but not as severe as some other areas of Bosnia. The Nordic brigade comprised of Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and recently joined by Poland, that will be colocated with American forces, have operated in the area for some time. They have heavy equipment. They have not tolerated interference. They have been friendly with the people of the area, and they have been firm. They are helping our advance team immensely with their advice and their knowledge of the area and of the people.

The Turkish brigade will be near American troops, which should help to temper the more extreme elements of the Moslem communities. Turkey is a key NATO ally with strong influence in the moderate Muslim world.

All of our commanders who have testified before our committee or who have spoken to me privately believe that the rules of engagement are clear, they are robust, and they are appropriate. They authorize the use of force,

including deadly force, in response to both hostile acts as well as, in the judgment of the commander, hostile intent. These are the same rules of engagement as were utilized in Haiti. Most importantly, the mission and the military task are doable, according to all of our military witnesses.

III. MILITARY MISSION

A. MISSION DEFINITION

The military mission is a subject of considerable importance in how it is defined. General Shalikashvili has defined our military mission as follows: "In an evenhanded manner, monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement."

General Shalikashvili has further listed the military tasks of the Dayton agreement as follows: Supervise selective marking of cease-fire line, inter-entity boundary line and zones of separation.

Monitor and, if necessary enforce, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within agreed periods as follows:

Ensure withdrawal of forces behind zones of separation within 30 days of transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to the Implementation Force;

Ensure redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other within 45 days of transfer of authority;

Ensure no introduction of forces into transferred areas for an additional 45 days;

Establish and man a 4-kilometer zone of separation—2 kilometers on either side of cease fire/inter-entity boundary line;

Establish liaison with local military and civilian authorities; and

Create a Joint Military Commission and subordinate military commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties.

In order to accomplish these military tasks, the Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement provides that "the IFOR Commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the IFOR and to carry out the responsibilities" under the agreement. The peace agreement, thus, gives the NATO Implementation Force well defined responsibilities—basically to separate the parties and create a stable environment—and grants it broad authorities to carry out its mission and to protect itself. In many ways, NATO's clearly defined responsibility with very broad authority and robust capability is the opposite of what the U.N. forces evolved into: broad and ill-defined responsibility with narrow authority and limited capability. The worst kind of combination. General Shalikashvili has testified that the military mission and the military tasks are appropriate and executable.

B. DEFINITION OF SUCCESS AND EXIT STRATEGY

There is a strong correlation between the definition of success when you are using military forces and also the exit strategy. I would like to briefly discuss those.

In discussing the obstacles to the success of the military mission we first must avoid confusing the military mission with the much broader U.S. and international political goals in Bosnia. It is a part of the overall political goals, but it is only one part of the broader goal.

In my view, we should view the military mission as a success if the Implementation Force provides the time and space for the parties, assisted by the international community, to begin a peaceful building process. I use the term "building" in both the physical and political sense; that is, both building the democratic processes for a unified nation and reconstructing the economy and the physical infrastructure of the nation.

The military part of the mission is to create the climate and stability required to begin the building process. The civilian part of the mission is to build the political and civil institutions that can endure. In the long run, only the parties themselves can bring about this success.

The building process is separate and distinct from the military mission. It is entirely possible that the military mission will be carried out with great professionalism and accomplish the military goal and still have the civilian building process end in dismal failure. That is what I think we have to recognize.

The success of the military mission will require a great deal of coordination with the Parties' military and civilian representatives and with the High Representative and the participating civilian organizations. The Joint Military Commission and subordinate military commissions at the brigade and battalion level will bring all of these parties together under the chairmanship of the Implementation Force commander and his local commanders. One of the principal uses of these forums is for the IFOR commander—U.S. Admiral Smith—and his subordinate commanders to work with the military commanders of the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs at all levels to convince them that peace is in the best interests of their respective peoples and that the military goal of regaining and holding lost territory is not achievable.

Mr. President, they do not have perfect civilian control in this part of the world. If we are going to really get a peace there that endures, a key part of that will be having the military leaders of each one of the parties, the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Moslems, Bosnian Croats, to recognize that peace is in the interests of the people that they represent. That is a key. Our military forces will play a key role in that kind of understanding. This is very, very important.

Bringing the military leadership of the opposing parties together under U.S. and NATO auspices to begin the slow and tortuous process of building trust and cooperation may be one of the most important NATO challenges and opportunities.

The exit strategy and the definition of a successful military mission flow together, in my view. Separating the parties—providing time and space for the civil building process—creating an environment of peace and stability—and through non-U.S. military means, leaving a reasonable military balance which gives the parties an opportunity to defend their own borders. These are all key components of "success" in the broad context and are required for a successful exit of U.S. and NATO forces within approximately 1 year.

IV. RISKS

A. RISKS TO THE MILITARY MISSION

Mr. President, I get a lot of letters, and I know all of my colleagues do, about the risks to the United States military forces. These risks are very much on the minds of all of us as we send our young men and women to this dangerous area of the world.

There are certainly risks involved in this military operation.

There are a number of risks to U.S. military personnel. First, I believe, is accidents, based on all the records of the U.N. Forces. Then landmines, snipers, attacks by extremists, hostage taking, and, finally, one that is overlooked many times; complacency of our military forces when things are going well. This complacency can lead to carelessness and can only be avoided by strong leadership from the unit level right on up.

General Shalikashvili testified that he does not believe that our forces will be subjected to attacks from organized combat units. He believes the greatest risk will come from accidents on the dangerous Bosnian roads. In this regard, it should be noted that the U.N. Protection Force sustained 213 deaths, of which 80 were due to combat and 133 due to other causes.

I am confident that the excellent equipment, training and discipline of our forces should minimize the risks, but there will undoubtedly be American casualties. Potential attackers should be on notice that the forces available to NATO and the robust rules of engagement mean that swift and overpowering responses will take place if NATO forces are attacked or provoked.

Our forces are supposed to be evenhanded, and I am sure they will be. But evenhanded does not mean, nor should it imply, being gentle when they are either attacked or when they detect hostile intent. NATO and the United States must insist that President Izetbegovic of Bosnia, fully meet his commitment to ensure that the mujahedin forces depart Bosnia within 30 days of the signing of the peace agreement. This has been a firm pledge by the Bosnian President.

This will be seen by the United States as well as a number of other parties, including the Bosnian Moslems, Bosnian Croats, as well as the Bosnian Serbs, as an indication of the extent of the Iranian and other outside Islamic fundamentalist influence on the Bosnian Moslems.

It is hard to imagine that the Bosnian Moslem and Croat Federation could hold together if there is a pervasive extreme Islamic fundamentalist influence within the Bosnian Muslim entity.

It is also hard to believe that the Bosnian Serbs, particularly those who are living in the suburbs of Sarajevo, and whose cooperation or at least acquiescence is necessary to the security of the forces of the French contingent in that area, will be reassured if the mujahedin do not depart as scheduled. Although I will not dwell on this today, while we are talking about risk, there is also a risk of renewed conflict in Eastern Slavonia or a flare-up in Kosovo.

B. RISKS RELATING TO ARMING AND TRAINING

There are also risks relating to arming and training, which is a mission that I would like to discuss just for a few minutes.

The Regional Stabilization Annex to the Framework Agreement gives the parties 180 days after the agreement was signed to negotiate limits on the levels of armaments. These negotiations are to be carried out under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). I want to emphasize that this is a civilian and not a military task and the NATO Implementation Force is not responsible for this effort. The fact that it is a civilian task does not mean that the United States will not play a leadership role in this effort. On the contrary, the United States should endeavor to play a strong leadership role since a general reduction in the number of arms in former Yugoslavia will reduce the risk to the United States and allied forces participating in the Implementation Force as well as improve the chance for lasting peace.

The U.S. commitment to lead an international effort to arm and train the Federation forces was essential to securing the peace agreement but we should make no mistake that it carries substantial risk. An assessment is already underway to identify the capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Federation, to assess what the Federation needs to redress its deficiencies, to plan how those needs will be met, and to commence training, since training may be provided immediately under the Regional Stabilization Annex and the UN Security Council resolution that lifts the arms embargo.

If arming and training is not carried out with care, it could wind up increasing the risk to United States forces in Bosnia and alienating our allies. It will be important to ensure that United

States forces in Bosnia are not involved and that the involvement of active duty United States military personnel is kept to administrative functions. In this regard, I was pleased to note that President Clinton, in his letter of December 12, 1995 to Senator DOLE on this issue, stated that "I will do nothing that I believe will endanger the safety of American troops on the ground in Bosnia." Mr. President, I believe all of us agree with that goal. It will also be important for the Administration to keep our allies informed on the steps we are taking and to take into consideration their comments.

The use of a third country, such as Turkey—a secular Muslim country, to carry out the training seems to be the best choice.

In the case of training, I believe the emphasis should be on small unit training and the maintenance, repair and use of defensive weapons and equipment.

In the case of arming, I believe that whatever arms are provided to the Federation, the emphasis must be on defensive capability. By defensive capability, I mean that the weapons, equipment, and training that are provided are suited to allow the force to defend itself rather than to enable it to conduct offensive operations to gain and hold territory. That is a very important distinction—in the kind of equipment we encourage to be furnished by other countries. In the case of weapons and equipment, it would mean emphasizing counter battery radar, night vision devices, communications equipment, anti-armor, ammunition, light vehicles, and the like rather than providing large numbers of tanks and artillery tubes. There also may be a need to perform some modest military construction to relocate the Federation forces out of the cities and towns in which they are presently located.

There are also risks to the military mission that relate to the accomplishment of the civilian political goals.

C. RISKS TO CIVILIAN/POLITICAL GOALS

It is obvious that the planning for the accomplishment of the military tasks is far ahead of that for the civilian tasks and that there is a serious and growing gap between the two.

NATO planning at the strategic and operational levels benefitted greatly from the planning accomplished over the last year relating to a possible NATO operation to extract the United Nations Protection Force from Bosnia.

Our military people have been going through contingency planning on this situation for some time.

Both planning efforts required a common set of data relating to the all-important logistics effort to insert forces rapidly, to stabilize the security situation, and to extract the force safely once the mission had been carried out. Additionally, NATO has an in-place staff that specializes in such planning and is trained to adapt its plans as more information on the specific military tasks become available, as was the

case during the negotiation of the General Framework Agreement and its Annexes.

By comparison, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the other organizations that will be involved in the civil political mission have no counterpart planning staffs and have no experience in carrying out many of the tasks they will carry out in Bosnia. For example, the High Representative was only named a little more than a week ago to the London Conference.

The broad international political goal is to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified country in a region in which peace and stability endures. Accomplishing that broad goal would require overcoming a number of obstacles that could defy its attainment and the civilian side of this will really have to address many of these obstacles.

Mr. President, all we have to do is look at Haiti to find out that you can have a military mission go extremely well but not have the economic development, the infrastructure development, and even the political development keep up with that. And you can still have a country that is hanging on the bare edge. That is the case in Haiti today, and that will also be the case in Bosnia unless the civilian side begins to catch up with the military side and really understand the obstacle to having stability in this region.

Such obstacles include the history of the region, the ethnic consciousness of significant parts of the population, the residual hatred resulting from the cruel and inhuman behavior of the warring parties, such as ethnic cleansing carried out by but not limited to the Bosnian Serbs, and the tendency of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs to identify with Croatia and Serbia respectively rather than with a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. Faced with such obstacles, reaching the broad political goals will be extremely difficult. The underlying causes of the conflict cannot be cured by the military mission. And it is important for all of us to understand that.

D. BOSNIA—ONE NATION OR PARTITION

Mr. President, the broad goal is to have one nation called Bosnia. There are other tugs in the direction of partition and those tugs have not ended.

The General Framework Agreement and its 11 Annexes contain a number of provisions that both reinforce and undermine the broad political goal of a united Bosnia.

On the positive side for unity, for example, the following provisions reinforce that goal: the commitment to free and fair elections and the protection of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms in the agreement; the vesting of responsibility in the Federal Government for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, immigration, and monetary policy; the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly, a Presidency,

and a Constitutional Court; and the arrangements for international assistance for rehabilitation.

On the other hand the following provisions are contrary to that goal of one Bosnia. On that side of the ledger, the recognition of two semi-autonomous entities, the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic, within clearly demarcated geographic boundaries, each of whom will have their own army; a Parliamentary Assembly whose legislation can be blocked by two-thirds of the representatives from the Federation or the Serb Republic or, in the case of a proposed decision deemed to be "destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb people," by a majority of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb Delegates.

We can understand in this parliamentary body how dicey that proposition is.

A three-member Presidency, consisting of one Bosnian, one Croat, and one Serb, in which a decision may be blocked by declaration of one Member that it is "destructive of the vital interest of the Entity" he represents.

E. FRAGILE ASSUMPTIONS

Another very tricky proposition, Mr. President, that I would like to mention before closing today are two fragile assumptions that are very important to the overall peace agreement. These are fragile assumptions, and they are interrelated assumptions.

The first assumption is that the Moslem-Croat Federation, which was formed as a result of a U.S. diplomatic initiative in the February 1994 Washington Agreement, will stay together. One only has to recall that the Muslims and Croats armies were actively fighting each other prior to the Washington Agreement and that, even afterwards, the functioning of the city of Mostar has essentially been stymied for more than a year as a result of the inability of the Moslem and Croat mayors to work together. So that is a very questionable assumption.

The second assumption, pertains to the Sub-Regional Arms Control Annex which contains a "default" formula for limits on armaments that kicks in if the Parties cannot agree otherwise within 180 days. They first have the opportunity to negotiate. If they do not negotiate, then this so-called default formula and ratios kick in. The assumption is that it is stabilizing to establish a ratio based on the population of the respective parties.

Under that formula, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, commonly referred to as Serbia, has a baseline or a limit of 5. The Republic of Croatia has a limit of 2 compared to 5. And Bosnia and Herzegovina have a limit of 2. So the ratio is 5 Serbia, 2 Croatia, and 2 for the Bosnia and Herzegovina entity. The limit for Bosnia is further divided on the basis of a ratio for the Federation 2 and 1 for the Serb Republic.

Assuming the ratios are met in the default formula—it requires a great leap of faith—but even if they are

reached, unless there has been significant political and economic progress, stability is far from assured.

If the Moslem Croat Federation stays together, the Bosnian Serbs' 2 to 1 disadvantage in arms compared to the Federation could serve as an incentive for them to align more closely with Serbia, to the detriment of the goal of a unified Bosnia.

If, on the other hand, the Federation does not stay together, the Bosnian Moslems will be at a 2 to 1 disadvantage in a potential two-front conflict with the combined strength of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs.

Now, I would say that it is unlikely that the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs will join in some kind of unified or coordinated attack against the Bosnian Muslims, but the Bosnian Muslims could in the future easily find themselves in a conflict with both parties. These fragile assumptions, which could go awry very easily, make it even more essential from my perspective that the goal of the arms control build-down, the first effort to build down the weapons, as well as any arm-and-train program, leave all the parties with primarily a defensive capability.

If we start basically building up offensive arms, these ratios and all the complexities are going to be vast.

In spite of these fragile and questionable assumptions, I believe that a build-down process is worth a try. I believe that we must undertake at least the effort.

Finally, it will be imperative for the United States to remain engaged at the highest diplomatic levels to assure that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other civilian organizations utilize the time available to them to undertake an intensive and focused effort to accomplish their task.

F. RISKS TO MILITARY MISSION RELATING TO CIVILIAN TASKS

Mr. President, possibly the greatest risk to the military mission is that there will be confusion of the military mission and the much broader U.S. and international political goals—confusion in the Congress and confusion in the country.

This has two aspects. The first is that there will be mission creep on the ground with the U.S. military being expected to assume more and more responsibility for the political or civilian aspects of the framework agreement. These include the task of continuing humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, the return of displaced persons and refugees, the holding of free elections, police functions within borders, and the like.

One of the trickiest areas is not about separating the forces. That is a clear military mission. But what happens within an area if you start having murders take place within the borders? Whose job is it to take on the policing of that? Certainly, the civilian mission will be to do what they can to restore

the function of the police forces, but in the meantime what does the United States military and what do other NATO militaries do when there is really chaos within the borders?

These are a few of the areas that could very easily lead to mission creep.

The second danger—and this is something I think all of us in the Congress have a keen responsibility to keep in mind in our remarks—relates to public perception of how we define the military mission's success or lack thereof. I noted earlier that the military mission is limited. Assuming the United States military leaves Bosnia in approximately 1 year and the conflict there resumes shortly thereafter, has the military mission been a failure under these circumstances? If the news media and the American public confuse our narrowly defined 1-year military mission with the long-term political goals for a united and stable and peaceful Bosnia, the perception of failure after 1 year is possible and perhaps even probable. So I think it is important for us to define these terms very carefully.

V. RESIDUAL FORCE

Since the plans for carrying out the civilian tasks are far behind the military side and since they are so important to the building process, the best case is that there will be a solid beginning toward accomplishing the civilian tasks during the first year of the military deployment. But it will be far from complete. Because of this, I believe that planning must start now for a residual military force to replace the NATO implementation force at the end of a year to give the parties and the organizations helping them the secure environment and confidence they need to continue the longer-term civilian task which without any doubt is going to take far longer than 1 year.

A residual force should not include United States ground forces, in my view, but could be supported by the United States in those military areas where we have unique capabilities. Such a residual force can be a United Nations peacekeeping force or a coalition of forces from European and other nations that are committed to seeing the building process continued. This will in most likelihood take a number of years. The point is that the planning for a residual force needs to commence as soon as possible.

Finally, as a necessary contingency, the United States should begin to work with our allies to ensure continuing cooperation to contain the conflict if the peace process breaks down, either while our troops are there or after we leave in about a year. NATO's vital interests in my view have never been involved in Bosnia itself—important interests, but not vital. But NATO's vital interests could certainly be involved if there is a spread of this conflict. Strategic planning within NATO must begin now for a long-term containment strategy if that breakdown occurs.

Mr. President, the United Nations deployment to Macedonia in which Unit-

ed States and Nordic forces are participating is a first step, only a first step but at least a first step, toward this broader containment strategy which may be essential in the long run.

Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their attention, and I thank the Chair for the time. I would at this point yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRIBUTE TO TOM PETTIT

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I want to take a moment to pay tribute to a friend and a former NBC correspondent, Tom Pettit, who passed away today in New York. For more than a generation, Tom gave millions of viewers a front-row seat to a world of news and politics. As NBC news vice president Bill Wheatley noted:

His work was always distinctive: There was never any doubt that it was a Tom Pettit report. Truly, he was among the very best in the profession that he so loved.

Having interviewed every President since Harry Truman, Tom certainly earned his stripes in broadcast journalism. He preserved many moments of history, including the tragic assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas. I know I speak for all of my colleagues in sending our thoughts and prayers to his wife, Patricia, and his children: Debra, Anne, James, and Robert.

JOINT STATEMENT

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, just for the information of my colleagues, following the meeting today at the White House, we issued a joint statement. I will just read the joint statement.

We have agreed that we will issue statements from now on so we do not have any problem about somebody saying something that might be misinterpreted. And the joint statement reads:

Today we had good meetings which built on the progress made in yesterday's discussions. Staff will prepare further analysis to clarify options for the budget advisory group, which will then advise the principals on outstanding issues. Following the meeting of the budget advisory group, the principals will meet again next Friday afternoon.

So there will be a meeting with the President and the Vice President, the chief of staff, Leon Panetta, and the leaders of the House and the Senate.

On Thursday of next week and Wednesday of next week, staff and the advisory committees will meet.

So without much elaboration, I will say, in my view, we had a good session, very positive. I felt people wanted to get something done.